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Dialetheism, Game Theoretic Semantics, and
Paraconsistent Team Semantics
Pietro Galliani
Abstract. We introduce a variant of Dependence Logic in which truth is
defined not in terms of existence of winning strategies for the Proponent
(Eloise) in a semantic game, but in terms of lack of winning strategies
for the Opponent (Abelard). We show that this language is a conserva-
tive but paraconsistent extension of First Order Logic, that its validity
problem can be reduced to that of First Order Logic, that it capable of
expressing its own truth and validity predicates, and that it is expres-
sively equivalent to Universal Second Order Logic Π11. Furthermore, we
prove that a Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic formula is consistent
if and only if it is equivalent to some First Order Logic sentence; and
we show that, on the other hand, all Paraconsistent Dependence Logic
sentences are equivalent to some First Order sentence with respect to
truth (but not necessarily with respect to falsity).
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010). Primary 03B53 ; Secondary
03B60.
Keywords. Paraconsistency, Team Semantics, Game Theoretic Seman-
tics.
1. Introduction
Dialetheism is the philosophical position according to which there exist true
contradictions. It has been proposed as a possible answer to the paradoxes of
self-reference; and moreover, although this is of less relevance for the purposes
of this work, it also is one potential approach to the logical treatment of
vagueness and transition states.1
Even though dialetheism is not the only possible motivation for the
study of paraconsistent logics, that is, logics in which the principle of explo-
sion (“Ex contradictione quodlibet”: from a contradiction, everything can be
The author acknowledges the support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (project
number DI 561/6-1).
1We refer to [2, 30, 29, 31] for a more in-depth discussion of this interesting area of research.
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derived) fails, it is easy to see that dialetheism plus the principle of explo-
sion plus modus ponens implies triviality: if there are true contradictions,
and any contradiction implies that everything is true, it follows at once that
everything is true.
This is a conclusion that appears to have some practical drawbacks, at
least if one maintains that what matters in a logic is the notion of truth
and/or logical consequence that it generates; and hence, it comes to little
surprise that dialetheism has been generally associated with paraconsistent
logics.
The purpose of the present work is to draw attention to a connection
between logics of imperfect information, and in particular Dependence Logic,
and dialetheism: more specifically, what we aim to show is that by making
a simple modification to the semantics of Dependence Logic - in brief, by
defining truth in terms of the absence of winning strategies for the Oppo-
nent in the semantic game, rather than in terms of the existence of winning
strategies for the Proponent - we obtain a paraconsistent logic with truth
gluts, that is, sentences that are both true and false. This logic is capable of
expressing its own truth and validity predicates; and, differently from other
logics for dialetheism such as the Logic of Paradox [28], its definition requires
no alterations to the definition of first order model or to the interpretations
of first order sentences.2
Furthermore, as we will see, this logic has very natural properties: it is
expressively equivalent to Universal Second Order Logic Π11, and therefore
the problem of finding its valid formulas is no harder than in the first order
case, and moreover a sentence of this logic is consistent over all models if
and only if it is equivalent to some first order sentence - in other words, the
consistent kernel of our logic is precisely First Order Logic.
This strongly suggests that the formalism which we will develop in this
work - and for whose semantics we will give a justification which is entirely
independent from issues of self-reference or paraconsistency - is, in a way, a
natural extension of First Order Logic to a formalism capable of expressing
its own truth predicate.
2. Games and Logics
In this section we will recall the basic definitions of Game Theoretic Semantics
and of logics of imperfect information such as IF Logic and, most importantly
for our purposes, Dependence Logic. Then we will discuss some of the main
properties of Dependence Logic, setting the background for the variant of it
which we will introduce and discuss in Section 3.
2These modifications may well be opportune if one wishes to model phenomena, such
as vagueness, that are not easily represented in a standard first order formalism: but they
should not be required for obtaining a conservative, paraconsistent extension of First Order
Logic which is able to deal with the paradoxes of self-reference.
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2.1. Game Theoretic Semantics
Game Theoretic Semantics [15, 17, 19] is an approach to semantics which is
inspired to Wittgenstein’s language games. In brief, Game Theoretic Seman-
tics associates sentences to semantic games, which represent debates between
a Proponent (called usually Eloise), who attempts to show that the sentence
is true, and anOpponent (called usually Abelard), who attempts to show that
the sentence is false; and then truth is defined in terms of the existence of
winning strategies in these games.
In Subsection 2.4, we will show how to construct such games for an
extension of First Order Logic; but informally speaking, the semantic games
associated to first order sentences can be defined as follows:
1. A first order atom R~t or t1 = t2 corresponds to a basic assertion, that
can be verified or falsified directly by the players: and the resulting
game, in which Eloise argues that R~t (or t1 = t2) is true in the model
and Abelard argues the contrary, is won by Eloise if this statement
holds in the model and by Abelard otherwise.
2. For Eloise to assert that ¬ψ means that she is willing to assert that her
opponent Abelard could not argue convincingly that ψ is true. Hence,
the semantic game for ¬ψ is just the game for ψ, but with the roles of
the players swapped.
3. For Eloise to assert that ψ ∨ θ means that she is willing to assert that
ψ holds or that θ holds. Hence, ψ ∨ θ corresponds to the game in which
Eloise chooses between ψ and θ, and then plays the corresponding
game.
4. For Eloise to assert that ∃vψ means that she is willing to assert that
ψ[m/v] for at least one element m, where ψ[m/v] is the expression ob-
tained by substituting m for v in ψ. Hence, ∃vψ(v) corresponds to the
game in which Eloise picks an element m of the model and plays the
semantic game for ψ[m/v].
This is all that there is in the definition of the semantic games for first order
expressions. These rules are entirely natural, and, one might argue, at least
as straightforward as the rules of Tarski’s semantics. Truth and falsity are
then defined in terms of the existence of winning strategies for the players:
Definition 2.1. For any model M and first order sentence φ, we say that φ is
game-theoretically true in M and we write M |=+G φ if and only if Eloise has
a winning strategy in the game corresponding to φ in M ; and we say that it
is game-theoretically false, and we write M |=−G φ, if and only if Abelard has
a winning strategy in this game.
Now, since these games are of finite length, of perfect information (in
the sense that at every stage of the game the players know everything about
the history of the game) and zero-sum, it follows from Zermelo’s Theorem
that any such game is determined, that is, at least one of the players has a
winning strategy. Hence, we have that the Game Theoretic Semantics satisfies
the Law of the Excluded Middle:
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Proposition 2.2. For any model M and first order sentence φ, either M |=+G φ
or M |=−G φ.
Corollary 2.3. For all models M and first order sentences φ, M |=+G φ ∨ ¬φ
Proof. Suppose that Eloise has a winning strategy for the game correspond-
ing to φ. Then she has a winning strategy for the game corresponding to
φ∨¬φ: she simply picks the left disjunct, then plays as in her winning strat-
egy for this subgame.
Suppose instead that Eloise has no winning strategies for φ. Then
Abelard has a winning strategy for φ: and since ¬φ corresponds to the game
for φ, but with the roles of the players swapped, it follows at once that
Eloise has a winning strategy for ¬φ. Then she also has a winning strategy
for φ ∨ ¬φ, in which she picks the right disjunct and then plays her winning
strategy for this subgame. 
Also, since swapping the players twice is the same as keeping them
unvaried, it is easy to see that the law of double negation holds for this
semantics:
Proposition 2.4. For all M , φ and d ∈ {+,−}, M |=dG ¬¬(φ) if and only if
M |=dG φ.
Furthermore, no terminal position of our games is winning for Abelard
and for Eloise both: as Avicenna, who famously stated that
anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten
and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not
to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned
would perhaps be glad to see, no reconciliation is possible, even in principle,
between somebody who asserts that an atomic formula BEATEN(x) is true and
somebody who asserts that it is false. And since all possible debates between
Eloise and Abelard end in terminal positions of this kind, we have that
Proposition 2.5. For no model M and first order sentence φ it holds that
M |=+G φ and M |=
−
G φ.
We can even show that the law of the excluded middle holds as an
expression of the language:
Proposition 2.6. For all models M and first order sentences φ, M |=+G ¬(φ∧
¬φ), where φ ∧ ¬φ stands for ¬(¬φ ∨ ¬¬φ).
Proof. By the law of double negation, we know that M |=+G ¬¬(¬φ ∨ ¬¬φ)
if and only if M |=+G ¬φ ∨ ¬¬φ. But this is an instance of the law of the
excluded middle, which we already proved. 
It is worth remarking here that the proof of Proposition 2.6 makes no use
whatsoever of Proposition 2.5, nor vice versa. In effect, the two propositions
are not related: 2.5 says that it is never the case for any semantic game that
Abelard and Eloise both have a winning strategy, whereas 2.6 says that
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Eloise has a winning strategy for all semantic games of a certain kind. In
the case of First Order Logic, these two statements turn out to be both true;
but as we will see in Subsection 2.6, there is a known conservative extension
of this logic for which 2.6 fails and 2.5 holds, and in Section 3 we will develop
one for which the opposite is the case.
So far so good. But an obvious question to ask at this point is: what
exactly is the relationship between Game Theoretic Semantics and Tarski’s
Compositional Semantics? As the following result, with which we end this
subsection, shows, these two semantics are not in competition with each other:
rather, they express precisely the same truth and satisfaction conditions,
albeit with different justifications!
Theorem 2.7. For all models M , first order formulas ψ with free variables in
~v = v1 . . . vn and assignments s with domain {v1 . . . vn}, M |=s ψ according
to Tarski’s Semantics if and only if M |=+G ψ[s(~v)/~v] according to Game
Theoretic Semantics.
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on ψ and poses no difficulties. 
Hence, any argument that can be used for justifying the acceptability of
Game Theoretic Semantics for First Order Logic can also be used to justify
the acceptability of Tarski’s Semantics, and vice versa. These two semantics
are simply different ways of generating the same notion of truth: choosing to
rely on one or on the other is at most a matter of mere convenience or of
preference.
However, as we will see in the next subsections, things change once we
start considering certain variants and extensions of First Order Logic.
2.2. Logics of Imperfect Information
One aspect of First Order Logic which accounts for much of its expressive
power is the fact that this formalism permits nested quantification, and, in
particular, alternation between existential and universal quantifiers. Through
this device, it is possible to specify complex patterns of dependence and in-
dependence between variables: for example, in the sentence
∀x∃y∀z∃wR(x, y, z, w), (2.1)
the existential variable w is a function of both x and z, whereas the existential
variable y is a function of x alone.
As Skolem’s normal form for (2.1) illustrates, nested quantification can
be understood as a restricted form of second-order existential quantification:
indeed, the above sentence can be seen to be equivalent to
∃f∃g∀x∀zR(x, f(x), z, g(x, z)). (2.2)
In First Order Logic, the notion of quantifier dependence or independence is
intrinsically tied to the notion of scope: an existential quantifier ∃y depends
on an universal quantifier ∀x if and only if the former is in the scope of
the latter. As observed by Henkin in [14], these patterns can be made more
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general. In particular, one may consider branching quantifier expressions of
the form 
 Q11x11 . . . Q1mx1m. . .
Qn1xn1 . . . Qnmxnm

 , (2.3)
where each Qij is ∃ or ∀ and all xij are distinct. The intended interpretation
of such an expression is that each xij may depend on all xij′ for j
′ < j, but
not on any xi′j′ for i
′ 6= i: for example, in the sentence(
∀x ∃y
∀z ∃w
)
R(x, y, z, w) (2.4)
the variable y depends on x but not on z, and the variable w depends on z
but not on x, and hence the corresponding Skolem expression is
∃f∃g∀x∀zR(x, f(x), z, g(z)) (2.5)
If, as we said, quantifier alternation in First Order Logic can be understood
as a restricted form of second order existential quantification, then, as a com-
parison between (2.2) and (2.5) makes clear, allowing branching quantifiers
can be understood as a weakening of these restrictions.
How restricted is second order existential quantification in Branching
Quantifier Logic, that is, in First Order Logic extended with branching quan-
tifier?
As proved by Enderton and Walkoe in [6] and [35], the answer is not
restricted at all ! Branching Quantifier Logic is precisely as expressive as Ex-
istential Second Order Logic (Σ11). Hence, Branching Quantifier Logic can be
understood as an alternative approach to the study of Σ11, of its fragments
and of its extensions; and indeed, much of the research done on the subject
can be seen as an attempt to study Σ11 through the lens of these variants of
first-order logic.
Independence Friendly Logic [18, 16, 27], also called IF Logic, can be
thought of as a linearization of Branching Quantifier Logic: rather than deal-
ing the unwieldy quantifier matrices of (2.3), Hintikka and Sandu introduced
slashed quantifiers ∃v/V with the intended interpretation of “there exists a
v, chosen independently from the variables in V ”. For example, the sentence
(2.4) can be translated in IF Logic as
∀x∃y∀z(∃w/{x, y})R(x, y, z, w) (2.6)
This - at first sight entirely unproblematic - modification led to a number of
important innovations on the semantic side.
Game-theoretical explanations for the semantics of branching quanti-
fiers predate the development of IF Logic; but it is with IF Logic that the
Game Theoretic Semantics for First Order Logic was extended and adapted
to a logic of imperfect information in a formal way. In Subsection 2.4, we
will present in some detail a successor of the Game Theoretic Semantics
for IF Logic; but in brief, in the Game Theoretic Semantics for IF Logic,
slashed quantifiers correspond to imperfect information moves in which the
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corresponding player has to select a value for the quantified variable without
having access to the values of the slashed variables.
Dependence Logic [32, 34], which we will start discussing in the next
subsection, is another variant of First Order Logic which adds to it the possi-
bility of expressing more patterns of dependence and independence between
variables. Rather than doing so by adding new forms of quantification, as we
will see, Dependence Logic isolates the notion of dependence in some new
dependence atoms : this approach - which, as discussed in [32], is equivalent
to the one of IF Logic, in the sense that any IF Logic sentence is equivalent
to a Dependence Logic sentence and vice versa - proved itself most fruit-
ful, and sparked the development of a number of technical results about the
properties of this formalism and its extensions and variants.3
2.3. Dependence Logic: Syntax
Dependence Logic is a conservative extension of First Order Logic which
adds to it dependence atoms =(~t1,~t2), with the intended interpretation of
“the value of ~t2 is a function of the value of ~t1”:
4 for example, Equations
(2.4) and (2.6) would be translated in Dependence Logic as
∀x∃y∀z∃w(=(z, w) ∧R(x, y, z, w)) (2.7)
where the fact that the choice of w may depend only on z is represented by
=(z, w).
More formally, the syntax of Dependence Logic can be given as follows:
Definition 2.8 (Syntax). Let Σ be a first order signature. Then the set of all
Dependence Logic formulas over Σ is given by
ψ ::= R~t | t1 = t2 | =(~t1,~t2) | ¬ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | ∃vψ
where R ranges over all relation symbols in Σ, ~t ranges over all tuples of
terms of signature Σ and of the required arities, t1 and t2 range over terms,
~t1 and ~t2 range over all tuples of terms and v ranges over all variables.
As usual, we will write t1 6= t2 as a shorthand for ¬(t1 = t2), ψ ∧ θ as a
shorthand for ¬((¬ψ) ∨ (¬θ)) and ∀vψ as a shorthand for ¬(∃v(¬ψ)).
Definition 2.9 (Free Variables and Sentences). Let ψ be a Dependence Logic
formula over a signature Σ. Then the set Free(ψ) of the free variables of ψ
is defined inductively as follows:
1. For all atomic formulas R~t, Free(R~t) is the set of all variables occurring
in ~t;
2. Free(t1 = t2) is the set of all variables occurring in t1 and t2;
3. Free(=(~t1,~t2)) is the set of all variables occurring in ~t1 and ~t2;
3We cannot give here a comprehensive account of this rapidly growing area of research:
but as a possible starting point, and with no pretense of completeness, we can refer the
interested reader to [32, 33, 1, 23, 22, 24, 13, 5, 7, 9, 10].
4In some versions of Dependence Logic, only atoms of the form =(~t1, t′) are allowed, where
t′ is a single term. This makes no real difference, as =(~t1, ~t2) is easily seen to be equivalent
to
∧
t′∈~t2
=(~t1, t′).
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4. Free(¬ψ) = Free(ψ);
5. Free(ψ ∨ θ) = Free(ψ) ∪ Free(θ);
6. Free(∃vψ) = Free(ψ)\{v}.
A formula ψ is said to be a sentence if Free(ψ) = ∅.
2.4. Dependence Logic: Game Theoretic Semantics
In this section, we will briefly recall the game theoretic semantics for Depen-
dence Logic. Our treatment will be entirely similar to the one of [32], and we
refer to it for a more detailed exposition.
As in the case of the Game Theoretic Semantics of First Order Logic,
our games will involve two players, the existential one (called Eloise) who
attempts to demonstrate the truth of a sentence in a model, and the univer-
sal one (called Abelard) who attempts to demonstrate its falsity. However,
differently from the case of First Order Logic, our games will be games of
imperfect information:
Definition 2.10 (Semantic Games). Let M be a first order model and let φ
be a Dependence Logic sentence over the signature of M . Then the semantic
game GM (φ) is defined as follows:
• Positions are triples (ψ, s, α), where ψ is an instance5 of a subformula
of φ, s is a variable assignment and α ∈ {Eloise, Abelard};
• The initial position is (φ, ∅, Eloise);
• The rules of the game are as follows:
1. If the current position is of the form (R~t, s, α), then Player α wins
if and only if M |=s R~t in the usual first order sense. Other-
wise, Player α∗ wins, where Eloise∗ = Abelard and Abelard∗ =
Eloise.
2. If the current position is of the form (t1 = t2, s, α), Player α wins if
and only if M |=s t1 = t2 in the usual first order sense. Otherwise,
Player α∗ wins.
3. If the current position is of the form (=(~t1,~t2), s, α), Player α wins.
4. If the current position is of the form (¬ψ, s, α), then the next
position is of the form (ψ, s, α∗).
5. If the current position is of the form (ψ ∨ θ, s, α), then the next
position is either (ψ, s, α) or (θ, s, α), and Player α chooses.
6. If the current position is of the form (∃vψ, s, α), Player α picks an
element m ∈ Dom(M). The next position is then (ψ, s[m/v], α).
The definitions of strategy and play can be given as usual, and we will
not report them here. For the sake of generality we will admit nondetermin-
istic strategies, which allow for the selection of multiple possible successors
5Different instances of a subformula inside of a formula - for example, the two occurrences
of Px in Px ∨ Px - correspond to different positions of our games. With an abuse of
notation, we will write instances of subformulas as if they were simply subformulas.
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of a given position.6 However, in order to represent the intended meaning of
dependence atoms we need the following notion of uniform strategy:
Definition 2.11. A strategy σ for Player α ∈ {Abelard, Eloise} is uniform
if for any two plays ~p1, ~p2 in which Player α follows σ and which end with
(=(~t1,~t2), s, α) and (=(~t1,~t2), s
′, α) respectively, for the same instance of the
dependence atom,
~t1〈s〉 = ~t1〈s
′〉 ⇒ ~t2〈s〉 = ~t2〈s
′〉.
The rationale behind this condition should be clear: a strategy for α
is uniform if and only if when Player α follows it and reaches a dependence
atom =(~t1,~t2), he or she can guarantee that the value of ~t2 will be a function
of the value of ~t1.
Truth and falsity are then defined in terms of the existence of uniform
winning strategies:
Definition 2.12. For any sentence φ and modelM , we say that φ is true inM ,
and we write M |=+ φ, if and only if Eloise has a uniform winning strategy
in GM (φ).
Similarly, φ is false in M if and only if Abelard has a uniform winning
strategy in GM (φ); and in that case, we write M |=− φ.
The following result then follows at once from the definition of the game
theoretic semantics:
Proposition 2.13. For all M and φ over the signature of M , φ is true if and
only if ¬φ is false and φ is false if and only if ¬φ is true.
Proof. Suppose that M |=+ φ, that is, that Eloise has a uniform winning
strategy in GM (φ). Now,GM (¬φ) is played exactly like GM (φ), except for the
fact that the first move of this game exchanges the roles of the two players;
and therefore, Abelard has a uniform winning strategy in this game, and
hence M |=− ¬φ.
The other direction and the second biimplication are verified similarly.

The fact that we are placing restrictions on which strategies we allow
accounts for the possible existence of truth gaps. For example, consider the
sentence ∀x∃y(=(∅, x) ∧ x = y). With respect to a model M with domain
{0, 1}, the semantic game corresponds to the matching pennies game:
1. First, Abelard selects an element m1 ∈ {0, 1};
2. Then, Eloise selects another element m2 ∈ {0, 1}, independently on
Abelard’s choice:7
6This is of no consequence for case of Dependence Logic proper, but it is useful in order to
preserve the property of locality (Theorem 2.18 here) in the case of other team-semantics
based extensions of first-order logic. See [9] for details.
7If the choice of Eloise is dependent on the choice of Abelard then Eloise’s strategy is not
uniform. Note that there is no need for Abelard’s strategy to ever pick the left conjunct
=(∅, x), which corresponds to a winning position for Eloise; the mere fact that such a
choice is possible implies that Eloise’s move must be independent from Abelard’s.
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3. Then the game ends. If m1 = m2, Eloise wins; otherwise, Abelard
wins.
Clearly, neither player has a winning strategy for this game: no matter
what value Abelard picks, he cannot make it impossible for Eloise to se-
lect the same value, but on the other hand since Eloise is not allowed to
spy Abelard’s choice she will not be able to guarantee that she will copy
Abelard’s selection.
2.5. Dependence Logic: Team Semantics
The game theoretic semantics which we described in the previous section is a
simple generalization of the one of First Order Logic. However, as we know,
First Order Logic can also be given the equivalent, compositional Tarski
Semantics, in which open formulas correspond to satisfaction conditions over
variable assignments. Is there any way to extend Tarski’s Semantics to the
case of Dependence Logic?
As [3] shows by means of a combinatorial argument, the answer is nega-
tive, as there exist models with more non-interchangeable Dependence Logic8
formulas with one free variable than sets of elements.9 However, not all is
lost: in [20], Hodges developed a compositional semantics for Independence
Friendly Logic, which we will call “Team Semantics” after [32], and whose
Dependence Logic variant (also from [32]) we will now describe.
The fundamental intuition behind Team Semantics is to take in consid-
eration teams, that is, sets of assignments, and to generalize semantic games
to initial assignments picked randomly from a team:
Definition 2.14 (Team). Let M be a first order model, and let V be a set of
variables. A team over M with domain V is a set X of variable assignments
over M with domain V .
Definition 2.15 (GMX (ψ) and Team Satisfaction). LetM be a first order model,
let ψ be a Dependence Logic formula over its signature, and let X be a
team over M such that Free(ψ) ⊆ Dom(X). Then the game GMX (ψ) is played
precisely like GM (ψ), but from a starting position selected randomly among
{(ψ, s, Eloise) : s ∈ X}.
If Eloise has a uniform winning strategy in GMX (ψ), we say that the
teamX satisfies positively (or just “satisfies”) ψ inM and we write (M,X) |=+
ψ; and similarly, if Abelard has a uniform winning strategy in GMX (ψ) we say
that X satisfies negatively ψ in M and we write (M,X) |=− ψ.
Clearly, we have that for all models M and sentences φ, M |=± φ if and
only if (M, {∅}) |=± φ.10
8Cameron and Hodges’ proof refers to IF Logic instead; but their argument can be adapted
with no difficulty to the case of Dependence Logic.
9The proof does not generalize to infinite models; however, [8] extends this result to this
further case by introducing a notion of sensible semantics.
10Some care must be paid to distinguish the team {∅}, which contains the empty assign-
ment, from the empty team ∅. As we said, if φ is a sentence then M |=+ φ if and only if
(M, {∅}) |=+ φ; but on the other hand, as we will see, (M, ∅) |=± φ for all φ.
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The advantage is that this satisfaction definition is compositional:
Theorem 2.16. For all models M , teams X, relation symbols R in its signa-
ture, tuples of terms ~t, ~t1, ~t2 and terms t1, t2 in its signature, and variables
v,
TS-atom+. (M,X) |=+ R~t if and only if for all s ∈ X, M |=s R~t in the
usual first order sense;
TS-eq+. (M,X) |=+ t1 = t2 if and only if for all s ∈ X, M |=s t1 = t2 in
the usual first order sense;
TS-dep+. (M,X) |=+=(~t1,~t2) if and only if for all s, s′ ∈ X,
~t1〈s〉 = ~t1〈s
′〉 ⇒ ~t2〈s〉 = ~t2〈s
′〉;
TS-neg+. (M,X) |=+ ¬ψ if and only if (M,X) |=− ψ;
TS-∨+. (M,X) |=+ ψ ∨ θ if and only if X = X1 ∪ X2 for two subteams
X1 and X2 such that (M,X1) |=+ ψ and (M,X2) |=+ θ;
TS-∃+. (M,X) |=+ ∃vψ if and only if there exists a function F : X →
P(Dom(M))\{∅} such that (M,X [F/v]) |=+ ψ, where X [F/v] = {s[m/v] :
s ∈ X,m ∈ F (s)}
and
TS-atom−. (M,X) |=− R~t if and only if for all s ∈ X, M 6|=s R~t in the
usual first order sense;
TS-eq−. (M,X) |=− t1 = t2 if and only if for all s ∈ X, M 6|=s t1 = t2 in
the usual first order sense;
TS-dep−. (M,X) |=−=(~t1,~t2) if and only if X = ∅;
TS-neg−. (M,X) |=− ¬ψ if and only if (M,X) |=+ ψ;
TS-∨−. (M,X) |=− ψ ∨ θ if and only if (M,X) |=− ψ and (M,X) |=− θ;
TS-∃−. (M,X) |=− ∃vψ if and only if (M,X [M/v]) |=− ψ, where X [M/v] =
{s[m/v] : s ∈ X,m ∈ Dom(M)}.
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on the formulas and poses no
particular difficulties. We refer the interested reader to [20, 32]. 
It is now easy to find the rules corresponding to our derived connectives
and operators:
Corollary 2.17.
TS-∧+. (M,X) |=+ ψ ∧ θ if and only if (M,X) |=+ ψ and (M,X) |=+ θ;
TS-∧−. (M,X) |=− ψ ∧ θ if and only if X = X1 ∪ X2 for two subteams
X1, X2 such that (M,X1) |=− ψ and (M,X2) |=− θ;
TS-∀+. (M,X) |=+ ∀vψ if and only if (M,X [M/v]) |=+ ψ;
TS-∀−. (M,X) |=− ∀vψ if and only if there exists a function F : X →
Dom(M) such that (M,X [F/v]) |=− ψ.
We conclude this subsection by observing that there is a clear asym-
metry between the positive and negative conditions for dependence atoms:
an atom =(~t1,~t2) is true in a team X if and only if the atom satisfies the
corresponding dependence condition, whereas it is false if and only if X = ∅.
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This is a direct consequence of the definition of truth in terms of ex-
istence of winning strategies: in brief, while a restriction on the information
available to a player can affect the existence or non-existence of winning
strategies for her, it has no such effect on the potential existence of winning
strategies for the other player - after all, the first player might well “get lucky”
and select the best response even in the absence of sufficient information.
2.6. Some Known Results
In this subsection, we will recall some of the properties of Dependence Logic.
Except where stated otherwise, all results are from [32].
Theorem 2.18 (Locality). For all formulas ψ of Dependence Logic, all models
M and all teams X1 and X2 whose restrictions to Free(φ) coincide,
(M,X1) |=
± ψ ⇔ (M,X2) |=
± ψ.
Theorem 2.19 (First Order Formulas). If ψ is first order,
TS-FO+. (M,X) |=+ ψ if and only if for all s ∈ X, M |=s ψ in the usual
first order sense;
TS-FO−. (M,X) |=− ψ if and only if for all s ∈ X, M 6|=s ψ in the usual
first order sense.
Therefore, a first order formula holds in a team only if it holds in all of
its assignments, and it fails in it only if it fails for all of its assignments. This
clarifies the reason for the presence of truth value gaps in this semantics: if
a team contains assignments which satisfy a formula and assignments which
do not satisfy it, then the formula is neither true nor false with respect to it.
Hence, with respect to first order formulas, Team Semantics can be thought
of as a form of supervaluationism.
Furthermore, we have as an easy corollary of this result that
Corollary 2.20. If φ is a first order sentence, M |=+ φ according to the
semantics of Dependence Logic if and only if M |= φ according to Tarski’s
Semantics. Similarly, M |=− φ if and only if M 6|= φ according to Tarski’s
Semantics.
However, in general the connectives of Dependence Logic behave rather
differently from those of First Order Logic. In particular, disjunction is not
idempotent: indeed, consider any model M with two elements 0 and 1 and
the team X = {(x := 0), (x := 1)}. Then we have that (M,X) |=+=(∅, x)∨ =
(∅, x), since X can be split into two subteams X1 = {(x := 0)} and X2 =
{(x := 1)} with respect to which x is constant; but on the other hand, x is
not constant in X , and therefore (M,X) 6|=+=(∅, x).
Theorem 2.21 (Downwards Closure). For all formulas ψ, models M , d ∈
{+,−} and teams X,Y , if (M,X) |=d ψ and Y ⊆ X then (M,Y ) |=d ψ.
The empty team ∅ satisfies all Dependence Logic formulas:
Proposition 2.22. For all models M and formulas φ over the signature of M ,
(M, ∅) |=+ φ and (M, ∅) |=− φ.
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As a consequence of this fact, the law of non-contradiction does not hold
in Dependence Logic, strictly speaking: for any formula φ, (M, ∅) |=+ φ∧¬φ.
Hence, Dependence Logic displays a (very weak) form of paraconsistency.
However, this following variant of non-contradiction holds:
Theorem 2.23 (Law of Non-Contradiction). If (M,X) |=+ φ and
(M,X) |=− φ then X = ∅.
In particular, this implies that for any sentence φ, it is never the case
that M |=+ φ and M |=− φ: no sentence is both true and false (although, as
we saw, there exist sentences which are neither).
Note, however, that ¬(φ∧¬φ) is not, in general, valid. For example, let
M contain at least two elements and take φ = ∀x∃y(=(∅, y) ∧ x = y): as we
saw, neither player has a winning strategy for GM (φ), and it follows easily
that the same holds for GM (¬(φ ∧ ¬φ)).
The same choice of φ, as an aside, also shows that φ ∨ ¬φ is not a
theorem of Dependence Logic; but due to the fact that Dependence Logic
admits truth gaps, this is less surprising.
What is, instead, highly surprising is the following result from [24],
which shows that the negation of Dependence Logic - which coincides to the
usual contradictory negation over first order sentences - behaves, in general,
very differently indeed from the contradictory negation:
Theorem 2.24. Let ψ1 and ψ2 be two formulas such that (M,X) |=+ ψ1 ∧ψ2
only if X = ∅. Then there exists a Dependence Logic expression θ such that
(M,X) |=+ θ ⇔ (M,X) |=+ ψ1
and
(M,X) |=− θ ⇔ (M,X) |=+ ψ2
for all models M whose signature contains the ones of ψ1 and ψ2 and for all
X with domain containing Free(ψ1) ∪ Free(ψ2).
Theorem 2.25 (Dependence Logic and Σ11 - sentences). For any sentence φ of
Dependence Logic there exists a existential second order sentence Φ such that
M |=+ φ if and only if M |= Φ. Conversely, any sentence Φ of Existential
Second Order Logic is equivalent to some Dependence Logic sentence φ.
What about open formulas of Dependence Logic? The following the-
orem shows that their satisfaction conditions correspond to Σ11-expressible,
downwards monotonic conditions over relations:
Theorem 2.26. For all formulas ψ of Dependence Logic and all sets of vari-
ables11 V = {v1 . . . vn} with Free(ψ) ⊆ V there exists a Σ11 sentence Φ(R),
where R is a new |V |-ary relation symbol, such that
(M,X) |=+ ψ ⇔M |= Φ(X(V ))
for all models M and teams X and for X(V ) = {s(v1 . . . vn) : s ∈ X}.
Furthermore, R occurs only negatively in Φ(R).
11We assume that the ordering of the variables of V is fixed in advance.
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The converse of this result - arguably one of the most important and
useful results about Dependence Logic - was proved in [23]:
Theorem 2.27. Let Φ(R) be a Σ11 sentence in which R occurs only negatively
and has arity n, and let V = {v1 . . . vn} be a set of variables. Then there
exists a Dependence Logic formula ψ with free variables in V such that
(M,X) |=+ ψ ⇔M |= Φ(X(V ))
for all models M and teams X.
Another one of the most interesting properties of Dependence Logic,
whose proof can be found in §6.4 of [32], is that this logic can define its own
truth operator! More precisely, what can be proved is that
Theorem 2.28. For any finite signature Σ containing the binary operations
+ and × there exists a Dependence Logic formula τ(x) with signature Σ
such that for all models Mω of Peano’s Axioms with signature Σ and for all
Dependence Logic sentences φ,
Mω |=
+ φ if and only if Mω |=
+ τ(pφq)
where pφq represents a Go¨del numbering for φ.
The fact that the law of the excluded middle fails for Dependence Logic
makes this formalism quite safe from the Liar Paradox. It is certainly possible
to find a sentence λ of Dependence Logic such that
Mω |=
+ τ(pλq)⇔Mω |=
+ λ⇔Mω |=
+ ¬τ(pλq)⇔Mω |=
− τ(pλq)
however, this expression λ will simply not be true in any model of Peano’s
Axioms, and therefore neither will τ(pλq) or its negation.
What about validity?
Due to the equivalence between Dependence Logic and Existential Sec-
ond Order Logic, the validity problem for Dependence Logic is highly unde-
cidable:
Theorem 2.29. The Validity Problem of Dependence Logic is Π2-complete
with respect to the Levy Hierarchy.12
Many important set-theoretic statements belong in this class, and there-
fore correspond to Dependence Logic sentences: for example, one can find a
Dependence Logic sentence which is valid if and only if there are no inacces-
sible cardinals (see Exercise 7.9 of [32])!
As a consequence, there is no hope whatsoever of finding a semidecid-
able, sound and complete proof system for Dependence Logic. However, [25]
describes a sound and complete Natural Deduction system for finding the
first order consequences of a Dependence Logic expression; and [12] intro-
duces a sound and complete axiom system for an extension of Dependence
12In brief, this is the class of the set-theoretic statements of the form ∀x∃yφ(x, y), where
φ only contains bounded quantifiers. See [26] for details.
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Logic, but with respect to a weaker semantics, analogous to Henkin’s general
semantics for Second Order Logic.
We barely scratched the surface of the current body of knowledge about
Dependence Logic here, of course. But these few results are perhaps sufficient
to point out some of the characteristics of this formalism, and will provide
an useful basis of comparison for the paraconsistent version of it that we will
develop in the next section.
3. Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic
In this section, we will introduce a novel, simple, paraconsistent variant of
Dependence Logic. As we will see, many of the known results about De-
pendence Logic can be transferred to this new formalism with no difficulty
whatsoever; and furthermore, as we will see, Paraconsistent Non-dependence
Logic will be able to express not only its truth predicate, but also its validity
predicate!
3.1. Paraconsistent Team Semantics
As we saw, the Game Theoretic Semantics of Dependence Logic is a variant
of that of First Order Logic in which a a player can only employ strategies
which respect certain uniformity conditions, specified in terms of dependence
atoms. Then, as in the first order case, one characterizes the truth or falsity
of Dependence Logic sentences in terms of the existence of uniform winning
strategies for the existential or the universal players.
However, one might wonder if this is condition is not too strict. If the
semantic games represent debates between agents about the truth of a sen-
tence, and if, as we saw, there exist some possible debates in which neither
agent can guarantee a victory, perhaps one might want to be more permissive
and say that a sentence is true if one’s opponent cannot reliably succeed in
falsifying it? This idea would correspond to the following truth definition:
Definition 3.1. For all models M , teams X and formulas ψ,
• (M,X) |=+P ψ if and only if Abelard has no winning strategy in G
M
X (ψ);
• (M,X) |=−P ψ if and only if Eloise has no winning strategy in G
M
X (ψ).
In particular, given a sentence φ, we say that φ is paraconsistently true in M ,
and we write M |=+P φ, if and only if (M, {∅}) |=
+
P φ; and we say that it is
paraconsistently false, and we write M |=−P φ, if and only if (M, {∅}) |=
−
P φ.
If our semantic games were determined, as the ones of First Order Logic
are, this definition would be obviously equivalent to the usual one: indeed, if
one of the players of a determined two-player game has no winning strategy,
it follows at once that the other does. However, this is not the case for our
games. For example, consider again the sentence φ = ∀x∃y(=(∅, y) ∧ x = y).
As we saw, if M has at least two elements then neither player has a winning
strategy GM (φ); and hence, we have at once that M |=+P φ and M |=
−
P φ. In
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other words, our φ is a simple example of a sentence which is both true and
false!
More in general, it is easy to see that for all M , X and ψ,
(M,X) |=±P ψ ⇔ (M,X) 6|=
∓ ψ.
This implies at once that the resulting formalism, which we will call
“Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic” is contained in Team Logic, that is,
in the extension of Dependence Logic which adds a contradictory negation to
it [33]. Furthermore, this property makes it trivial to find the Team Semantics
rules for this logic
Theorem 3.2. For all models M , teams X, relation symbols R in its signature,
tuples of terms ~t and terms t1, t2 in its signature, variables v and sets of
variables V ,
PTS-atom+. (M,X) |=+P R~t if and only if there exists a s ∈ X such that
M |=s R~t in the usual first order sense;
PTS-eq+. (M,X) |=+P t1 = t2 if and only if there exists a s ∈ X such that
M |=s t1 = t2 in the usual first order sense;
PTS-dep+. (M,X) |=+P=(~t1,~t2) if and only if X 6= ∅;
PTS-neg+. (M,X) |=+P ¬ψ if and only if (M,X) |=
−
P ψ;
PTS-∨+. (M,X) |=+P ψ ∨ θ if and only if (M,X) |=
+
P ψ or (M,X) |=
+
P θ;
PTS-∃+. (M,X) |=+P ∃vψ if and only if (M,X [M/x]) |=
+
P ψ.
and
PTS-atom−. (M,X) |=−P R~t if and only if there exists a s ∈ X such that
M 6|=s R~t in the usual first order sense;
PTS-eq−. (M,X) |=−P t1 = t2 if and only if there exists a s ∈ X such that
M 6|=s t1 = t2 in the usual first order sense;
PTS-dep−. (M,X) |=−P=(~t1,~t2) if and only if there exist two s, s
′ ∈ X
which assign the same values to ~t1 but not to ~t2;
PTS-neg−. (M,X) |=−P ¬ψ if and only if (M,X) |=
+
P ψ;
PTS-∨−. (M,X) |=−P ψ ∨ θ if and only if for all Y and Z such that X =
Y ∪ Z, (M,Y ) |=−P ψ or (M,Z) |=
−
P θ;
PTS-∃−. (M,X) |=−P ∃vψ if and only if for all F : X → P(Dom(M))\{∅},
(M,X [F/v]) |=−P ψ.
Defining conjunction and universal quantification in the usual way, we
have that
PTS-∧+. (M,X) |=+P ψ∧θ if and only if whenever X = Y ∪Z, (M,Y ) |=
+
P
ψ or (M,Z) |=+P θ;
PTS-∧−. (M,X) |=−P ψ ∧ θ if and only if (M,X) |=
−
P ψ or (M,X) |=
−
P θ;
PTS-∀+. (M,X) |=+P ∀vψ if and only if for all F : X → Dom(M), (M,X [F/v]) |=
+
P
ψ;
PTS-∀−. (M,X) |=−P ∀vψ if and only if (M,X [M/v]) |=
−
P ψ.
The rules that this semantics assigns to =(~t1,~t2), however, do not model the
notion of functional dependency in the same sense in which those of standard
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team-semantics do. Rather, they correspond to the notion of non-dependency:
(M,X) |=−P=(~t1,~t2) if and only if ~t2 is not functionally dependent on ~t1 in
X .
Thus, we will define 6=(~t1,~t2) as the formula ¬ =(~t1,~t2) and we will think
of it as a non-dependence atom. Obviously, the satisfaction conditions this
atom are obtained by switching the + and − signs in those of the dependence
atom: in other words, they will hold positively in a team X if and only if ~t2
is not a function of ~t1 in X , and it will hold negatively in it only if X 6= ∅.
3.2. Properties
Most of the properties of Dependence Logic are in natural correspondence
with properties of Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic. To begin with, it
is clear that locality (in the sense of Theorem 2.18) holds for Paraconsistent
Non-dependence Logic too; and furthermore,
Theorem 3.3. If ψ is first order,
PTS-FO+. (M,X) |=+P ψ if and only if there is a s ∈ X such that M |=s ψ
in the usual first order sense;
PTS-FO−. (M,X) |=−P ψ if and only if there is a s ∈ X such that M 6|=s ψ
in the usual first order sense.
As a consequence, we have that if φ is a first order sentence, M |=+ φ
in Team Semantics if and only if M |=+P φ in Paraconsistent Team Semantics
if and only if M |= φ in Tarski’s semantics. Hence, like Dependence Logic
proper, Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic is a conservative extension of
First Order Logic.
As we saw, in Dependence Logic there exist no sentence φ and model
M such that M |=+ φ∧¬φ; but there exist modelsM and Dependence Logic
sentences φ such that M 6|=+ ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ). On the other hand, there certainly
exist sentences φ and models M such that M |=+P φ ∧ ¬φ; and furthermore,
Proposition 3.4. For all models M , formulas ψ in the signature of M and
nonempty teams X with Free(ψ) ⊆ Dom(X),
(M,X) |=+P ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ψ)
Proof. Clearly, (M,X) |=+P ¬(ψ∧¬ψ) if and only if (M,X) |=
−
P ψ∧¬ψ, that
is, if and only if (M,X) |=−P ψ or (M,X) |=
+
P ψ. Suppose that neither of
these is the case: then we have that (M,X) |=+ ψ and (M,X) |=− ψ, which
is impossible because of Theorem 2.23. 
This is indeed a peculiar situation. Dependence Logic, which admits
truth gaps, does not satisfy either the Law of Excluded Middle φ ∨ ¬φ nor
the Law of Non-Contradiction ¬(φ∧¬φ); and Paraconsistent Non-dependence
Logic, which admits truth gluts, satisfies both! The key for understanding
this, of course, is to notice that the semantic games for Paraconsistent Non-
dependence Logic formulas are not determined and, hence, our semantics for
the negation in terms of player swapping - while being completely natural
from a game-theoretic perspective - does not correspond to the contradictory
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negation: in general, asserting ¬φ in Dependence Logic or in Paraconsistent
Non-dependence Logic is not at all the same as rejecting φ, although it reduces
to it in the case of first order expressions.
Just as Dependence Logic satisfies the Downwards Closure property of
Theorem 2.21, Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic satisfies the following
Upwards Closure Property:
Theorem 3.5. For all models M , teams X,Y over it with X ⊆ Y , formulas
ψ over the signature of M with Free(ψ) ⊆ Dom(X) and d ∈ {+,−},
(M,X) |=dP ψ ⇒ (M,Y ) |=
d
P ψ
Proof. This can be proved very easily by means of Theorem 2.21, or, al-
ternatively, by induction on ψ. However, we will show yet another proof,
which uses the game-theoretic definition of truth and falsity in Paraconsis-
tent Non-dependence Logic. Suppose that Player α ∈ {Abelard, Eloise} has
no uniform winning strategy in GMX (ψ). Then, since X ⊆ Y he or she also
has no uniform winning strategy in GMY (ψ): indeed, if a uniform strategy won
this game for ψ starting from all initial assignments in Y , he or she could
also win starting from all assignments in X ⊆ Y . 
Similarly, we have that
Proposition 3.6. For all models M , formulas ψ, and d ∈ {+,−}, (M, ∅) 6|=dP
ψ.
Proof. Let +∗ = − and −∗ = +. Now, by Proposition 2.22, we know that
(M, ∅) |=d
∗
ψ; but (M, ∅) |=dP ψ if and only if (M, ∅) 6|=
d∗ ψ, and hence it
follows at once that (M, ∅) 6|=dP ψ. 
Also, as easy consequences of Theorems 2.25 and 2.26, we have that
Theorem 3.7. For any sentence φ of Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic
there exists an universal second order sentence Φ such that M |=+P φ if and
only if M |= Φ. Conversely, any universal second order sentence Φ is logically
equivalent to some Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic sentence.
Theorem 3.8. For all formulas ψ of Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic
and all sets of variables V = {v1 . . . vn} with Free(ψ) ⊆ V there exists a Π11
sentence Φ(R), where R is a new |V |-ary relation symbol, such that
(M,X) |=+P ψ ⇔M |= Φ(X(V ))
for all models M and teams X. Furthermore, R occurs only positively in
Φ(R).
Similarly, we have the following consequences of Theorems 2.24 and
2.27:
Theorem 3.9. Let ψ1 and ψ2 be two formulas such that (M,X) |=
+
P ψ1 ∨ ψ2
for all models M over the signature of ψ1 and ψ2 and for all nonempty teams
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X with Free(ψ1) ∪ Free(ψ2) ⊆ Dom(X). Then there exists an expression θ
such that
(M,X) |=+P θ ⇔ (M,X) |=
+
P ψ1
and
(M,X) |=−P θ ⇔ (M,X) |=
+
P ψ2
for all models M whose signature contains the ones of ψ1 and ψ2 and for all
X with domain containing Free(ψ1) ∪ Free(ψ2).
Proof. Let ψ1 and ψ2 be as in our hypothesis, and consider θ1 = ¬ψ1 and θ2 =
¬ψ2. Now, suppose that (M,X) |=+ θ1 and (M,X) |=+ θ2: then (M,X) 6|=
+
P
ψ1 and (M,X) 6|=
+
P ψ2, and hence (M,X) 6|=
+
P ψ1 ∨ ψ2, and hence X = ∅.
Therefore, by Theorem 2.24, there exists a formula θ such that (M,X) |=+ θ
if and only if (M,X) |=+ θ2 and (M,X) |=− θ if and only if (M,X) |=+ θ1.
Then
(M,X) |=+P θ ⇔ (M,X) 6|=
− θ ⇔ (M,X) 6|=+ θ1 ⇔
⇔ (M,X) |=−P θ1 ⇔ (M,X) |=
+
P ψ1
and
(M,X) |=−P θ ⇔ (M,X) 6|=
+ θ ⇔ (M,X) 6|=+ θ2 ⇔
⇔ (M,X) |=−P θ2 ⇔ (M,X) |=
+
P ψ2
as required. 
Theorem 3.10. Let Φ(R) be a Π11 sentence in which R occurs only positively
and has arity n, and let V = {v1 . . . vn} be a set of variables. Then there
exists a Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic formula ψ with free variables
in V such that
(M,X) |=+P ψ ⇔M |= Φ(X(V ))
for all models M and teams X.
Proof. Let Φ(R) be a Π11 sentence as in our hypothesis. Then ¬Φ(R) is equiv-
alent to some Σ11 sentence in which R occurs only negatively; and therefore,
by Theorem 2.27, there exists a Dependence Logic formula θ such that
(M,X) |=+ θ ⇔M |= ¬Φ(X(V )).
Now take ψ = ¬θ: then
(M,X) |=+P ψ ⇔ (M,X) 6|=
− ¬θ ⇔ (M,X) 6|=+ θ ⇔
⇔M 6|= ¬Φ(X(V ))⇔M |= Φ(X(V ))
as required. 
So far so good: Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic is so tightly cou-
pled with Dependence Logic that importing even sophisticated Dependence
Logic results into it is quite unproblematic.
Is Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic capable of expressing its own
truth predicate, like Dependence Logic is? As we will now see, the answer is
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positive, and furthermore this truth predicate is a simple variant of the truth
predicate for Dependence Logic:
Theorem 3.11. For any finite signature Σ containing the binary operations +
and ×, there exists a Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic formula τ(x) with
signature Σ such that for all models Mω of Peano’s Axioms with signature Σ
and for all sentences φ,
Mω |=
+
P φ if and only if Mω |=
+
P τ(pφq)
where pφq represents a Go¨del numbering for φ.
Proof. Let τ∗ be the truth predicate for Dependence Logic of Theorem 2.28,
such that
Mω |=
+ φ if and only if Mω |=
+ τ∗(pφq)
for all φ.
Furthermore, let Neg(x) be a term such that Neg(pφq) = p¬φq; and
finally, define τ(x) = ¬τ(Neg(x)). Then for all models Mω of Peano’s Axioms
with signature Σ,
Mω |=
+
P τ(pφq)⇔Mω |=
−
P τ
∗(Neg(pφq))⇔
⇔Mω 6|=
+ τ∗(p¬φq)⇔Mω 6|=
+ ¬φ⇔
⇔Mω 6|=
− φ⇔Mω |=
+
P φ
as required. 
Once again, a difficult and important result for Dependence Logic can
be transferred to Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic with very little trou-
ble! The answer that Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic gives to the Liar
Paradox is, of course, the dialetheist one. It is possible to find an expression
λ such that Mω |=+ τ(λ) if and only if Mω |=− λ for all models of Peano’s
Axioms Mω; and for all such models, we will simply have that λ and τ(λ)
are both true and false.
Hence, Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic is a paraconsistent, con-
servative extension of First Order Logic that can express its own truth pred-
icate!
3.3. Validity in Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic
In this section, we will examine the following concept of validity in Paracon-
sistent Non-dependence Logic:
Definition 3.12 (P-Validity).
A sentence φ of Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic is paraconsistently
valid, or P-valid, if and only if M |=+P φ for all first order models M whose
signature contains that of φ.
It is easy to see that differently from the case of Dependence Logic, valid-
ity in Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic is semidecidable and reducible
to validity in First Order Logic. This follows at once by the equivalence
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between Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic and Π11: every Paraconsis-
tent Non-dependence Logic sentence is logically equivalent to (and effectively
translatable into) some sentence of the form ∀ ~XΨ( ~X), where Ψ is first order,
and hence it is valid if and only if Ψ(~R) is valid for some new tuple of relation
symbols ~R.
What about a proof system for this formalism? Once again, known re-
sults from Dependence Logic come to our succor: in particular, we can reduce
the problem of finding valid Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic sentences
to the problem of finding contradictory Dependence Logic sentences, which
can be solved using Kontinen and Va¨a¨na¨nen’s proof system!
Theorem 3.13. A sentence φ is P-valid if and only if for all models M , M 6|=
¬φ with respect to Dependence Logic, that is, if and only if ¬φ |= ⊥ with
respect to the Dependence Logic consequence relation.
Proof. Trivial. 
Hence, in order to check whether a sentence φ is P-valid, it suffices to
check whether ¬φ entails ⊥ with respect to the proof system of [25].
Finally, let us check that Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic can de-
fine its own validity predicate too. The main ingredient of the proof will be
the following lemma:
Lemma 3.14. For any signature Σ exists a first order sentence πΣ, with sig-
nature Σ∪ {+,×, P}, where P is a new symbol, such that for all models Mω
of Peano’s Axioms, (Mω, P ) |= πΣ if and only if P represents a provability
predicate for Paraconsistent Non-Dependence Logic, in the sense that for all
Paraconsistent Non-Dependence Logic sentences φ and all p ∈Mω
(p, pφq) ∈ P ⇔ p encodes a proof of φ.
We will not show the proof of this lemma here, but it poses no real
difficulties: in brief, we encode its axioms and rules of the axiom system for
Dependence Logic of [25] in the definition of πΣ in such a way that (p, pφq) ∈
P if and only if p represents a proof of ¬φ ⊢ ⊥. Note that πΣ only needs to
be a first-order sentence: informally speaking, this corresponds to the known
fact that the problem of the validity of Π11 sentences can be straightforwardly
reduced to the problem of the validity of first-order sentences.
Now we can prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 3.15. For any finite signature Σ containing the binary operations +
and ×, there exists a Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic formula ρ(x) with
signature Σ such that for all models Mω of Peano’s Axioms with signature Σ
and for all sentences φ of Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic,
Mω |=
+
P ρ(pφq)⇔ φ is P-valid
Proof. By the previous lemma we know that φ is valid if and only if whenever
Mω satisfies Peano’s Axioms,
Mω |= ∀P (πΣ → ∃p(Pppφq)).
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Now let c be a new constant symbol, and consider the expression ρ(c) =
∀P (πΣ → ∃p(Ppc)). Since this is a sentence in Π11, there exists a Paracon-
sistent Non-dependence Logic sentence ρ(c) which is equivalent to it. Then
ρ(x) is the formula that we were searching: indeed,
Mω |=
+ ρ(pφq)⇔Mω |= ∀P (πΣ → ∃p(Pppφq))⇔
⇔ φ is provable ⇔ φ is P-valid.

Again, the fact that Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic admits truth
gluts deals easily with the resulting paradox of self-reference. It is possible to
find a sentence ν that is valid if and only if ¬ρ(pνq) is valid and, therefore,
if and only if ¬ν is valid; but this is not a problem, as then we simply have
that ν and ¬ν are both valid.
3.4. Consistent Sentences in Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic
In this subsection, we will attempt to to characterize the sentences of Para-
consistent Non-dependence Logic which are consistent, in the sense given by
the following definition:
Definition 3.16 (Consistent Sentences). A sentence φ is consistent if and only
if there is no model M such that M |=+P φ and M |=
−
P φ.
As we will see, a Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic sentence is con-
sistent if and only if it is equivalent to some First Order Logic sentence. This
shows that Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic is a very “cautious” sort of
paraconsistent logic, in the sense that its consistent kernel is precisely First
Order Logic itself.
Our result is based on the flattening technique from ([32], §3.5):
Definition 3.17 (Flattening). Let ψ be a Paraconsistent Non-dependence
Logic formula. Its flattening ψf is the first order formula defined recursively
as follows:
1. If ψ is a first order atom, ψf = ψ;
2. For all dependence atoms =(~t1,~t2), (=(~t1,~t2))
f = ⊤;
3. (¬ψ)f = ¬(ψ)f ;
4. (ψ ∨ θ)f = ψf ∨ θf ;
5. (∃vψ)f = ∃v(ψf ).
Proposition 3.18. For all modelsM , teams X over M , formulas ψ of Paracon-
sistent Non-dependence Logic over the signature of M and with free variables
in X, and d ∈ {+,−},
(M,X) |=dP ψ
f ⇒ (M,X) |=dP ψ.
Proof. This can be proved by induction with little difficulty. Alternatively, we
may recall from Proposition 3.40 of [32] that if (M,X) |=d ψ then (M,X) |=d
ψf and that, by definition, (M,X) |=dP ψ if and only if (M,X) 6|=
d∗ ψ and
(M,X) |=dP ψ
f if and only if (M,X) 6|=d
∗
ψf . The result then follows at
once. 
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We now have all that we need to prove our main result for this subsec-
tion:
Theorem 3.19. Let φ be a Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic sentence that
is consistent. Then φ is logically equivalent to φf .
Proof. We already know that for all models M and d ∈ {+,−}, if M |=dP φ
f
then M |=dP φ. Hence, we only need to verify the converse implication.
Suppose that M 6|=+P φ
f : then, since φf is first order, M |=−P φ
f , and
therefore M |=−P φ, and therefore - since φ is consistent - M 6|=
+
P φ. Similarly,
if M 6|=−P φ
f then M |=+P φ
f , and therefore M |=+P φ and M 6|=
−
P φ, as
required. 
4. Generalized Dependencies in Paraconsistent Team
Semantics
Even though functional dependency was the first dependency notion which
was studied in the context of Team Semantics, it was by no means the only
one. Many other notions of dependence or independence atoms have been
studied in this context, such as for example the independence atoms [13]
TS-ind. (M,X) |=+ ~t1 ⊥ ~t2 if and only if X(~t1~t2) = X(~t1)×X(~t2),
the inclusion and exclusion atoms [9]
TS-inc. (M,X) |=+ ~t1 ⊆ ~t2 if and only if X(~t1) ⊆ X(~t2),
TS-exc. (M,X) |=+ ~t1|~t2 if and only if X(~t1) ∩X(~t2) = ∅,
or the multivalued dependence atoms [7]
TS-mdep. (M,X) |=+ ~x ։ ~y if and only if for every s, s′ ∈ X with
s(~x) = s′(~x) there exists a s′′ ∈ X such that s′′(~x~y) = s(~x~y) and
s′′(z) = s′(z) for all variables z ∈ Dom(X)\{~x~y};
and the study of the resulting logics and their relationship (in particular,
of the definability relations between such dependency notions) is a currently
very active area of research. As always, there is little trouble transferring the
resulting findings from the case of team semantics to the case of paraconsis-
tent team semantics; for instance, since we know from [9] that all nonempty
NP properties of teams correspond to the satisfaction conditions of formulas
of Independence Logic (that is, of First Order Logic with team semantics plus
independence atoms), it follows at once that all co-NP properties of teams
correspond to satisfaction conditions of formulas for the paraconsistent dual
of this logic.
In this section, we will focus on the case of Paraconsistent Dependence
Logic, that is, the logic obtained by adding directly the functional dependency
atom = (~t1,~t2) of Team Semantics to the Paraconsistent Team Semantics
rather than transforming it into its dual 6= (~t1,~t2). As we will see, every
sentence of Paraconsistent Dependence Logic is logically equivalent to some
sentence of First Order Logic.
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Thus, functional dependence atoms - or, as we will see, any other first-
order, downwards-closed dependency conditions - do not increase the expres-
sive power of First Order Logic with Paraconsistent Team Semantics. It is
important, however, to keep in mind that this result applies to sentences and
not to formulas: indeed, it is easy to see that the functional dependence atom
=(∅, x) is not logically equivalent (in Paraconsistent Team Semantics) to any
formula of Paraconsistent Dependence Logic (and, in particular, to any first
order formula), since it is not upwards closed in the sense of Theorem 3.5.
Nonetheless, any sentence which uses such an atom can be converted into one
which does not use it.
Let us begin with some definitions:
Definition 4.1 (Dependencies and First Order Dependencies). Let k ∈ N.
A dependency D is a family, closed under isomorphisms, of models over the
signature {P}, where P is a k-ary predicate symbol. The corresponding sat-
isfiability conditions in Team Semantics and Paraconsistent Team Semantics
are given by
TS-D+:. (M,X) |=+ D~t if and only if (Dom(M), X(~t)) ∈ D;
TS-D−:. (M,X) |=− D~t if and only if X = ∅;
PTS-D+. (M,X) |=+P D~t if and only if (Dom(M), X(~t)) ∈ D;
PTS-D−. (M,X) |=−P D~t if and only if X 6= ∅.
13
Such a dependency is said to be first order if there exists a first-order sentence
D∗ such that
M ∈ D⇔M |= D∗
for all models M = (A,S) over the signature {P}. Given a family of depen-
dencies D, we write FO(D) and PFO(D) for the logics obtained by adding all
these dependencies to the language of first-order logic (with Team Semantics
or Paraconsistent Team Semantics, respectively).
Even if D is a first order dependency, there is in general no guarantee
that FO(D) and PFO(D) are no more expressive than First Order Logic.
For instance, all the non-dependency atoms 6= (~t1,~t2) are first order, for
D∗ = ∃~x~y1~y2(P~x~y1 ∧ P~x~y2 ∧ ~y1 6= ~y2); and, as we saw, all Π11 properties
are expressible in terms of such dependencies (and of the language of First
Order Logic, interpreted according to Paraconsistent Team Semantics). The
same can be said about functional dependency atoms in team semantics.
13For simplicity’s sake, we limit ourselves to assigning non-trivial conditions to positive
satisfiability. However, there are no great difficulties in generalizing this approach to the
case in which nontrivial positive and negative satisfaction conditions. The reason why a
negated dependence atom is assumed to be true only in the empty set in the case of Team
Semantics and to be true in all teams except the empty set in the case of Paraconsistent
Team Semantics is that we want to maintain the correspondence between team semantics
and game-theoretic semantics insofar as it is possible, and either player has - trivially - a
winning strategy for all games starting from the empty set of winning strategies.
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Definition 4.2 (Downwards and Upwards Closed Dependencies). A depen-
dency D is said to be downwards closed if and only if
(A,S) ∈ D, S′ ⊆ S ⇒ (A,S′) ∈ D
for all models (A,S) over the signature {P}. Similarly,D is said to be upwards
closed if and only if
(A,S) ∈ D, S ⊆ S′ ⇒ (A,S′) ∈ D.
We will make use of the following result, from [11]:
Theorem 4.3. Let D be a family of first order, upwards closed dependencies.
Then every sentence φ of FO(D) is positively logically equivalent to some first
order sentence φ′, in the sense that
M |=+ φ⇔M |= φ′
for all suitable models M .14
Corollary 4.4. Let 6=(·, ·) represent the family of all non-dependency atoms.
Then every sentence of FO(=(·, ·)) is equivalent to some first order sentence.
Proof. It suffices to observe that all such atoms are first order and upwards
closed. 
Another ingredient of our proof will be the following observation:
Lemma 4.5. Let =(·, ·) represent the family of all functional dependency atoms
and the family of all functional non-dependency atoms respectively. Then for
any formula φ of PFO(=(·, ·)) there exists some formula φ∗ of FO(6=(·, ·))
such that
(M,X) |=±P φ⇔ (M,X) 6|=
± φ∗.
Proof. Let φ∗ be the formula obtained from ¬φ by replacing all dependence
atoms = (~t1,~t2) with negations of the the corresponding non-dependence
atoms ¬ 6=(~t1,~t2). We show, by induction on φ, that φ∗ works as required:
• For all first-order atoms R~t, (M,X) |=±P R~t ⇔ (M,X) 6|=
∓ R~t ⇔
(M,X) 6|=± ¬R~t, as required.
• (M,X) |=+P=(~t1,~t2) if and only if any two s, s
′ ∈ X which coincide over
~t1 also coincide over ~t2. But this is the case if and only if (M,X) 6|=+ 6=
(~t1,~t2), that is, if and only if (M,X) 6|=+ ¬¬ 6=(~t1,~t2), as required.
On the other hand, (M,X) |=−P=(~t1,~t2) if and only ifX is nonempty;
and that is the case if and only if (M,X) 6|=− ¬¬ 6=(~t1,~t2), since any
generalized dependence atom is satisfied by a team X in Team Seman-
tics if and only if the team is empty.
• (M,X) |=±P ¬φ if and only if (M,X) |=
∓
P φ: and by induction hypothesis,
this is the case if and only if (M,X) 6|=∓ φ∗, that is, if and only if
(M,X) 6|=± (¬φ)∗.
14However, it is not in general guaranteed that the negation of φ in Team Semantics is
equivalent to the negation of φ′ in Tarski’s semantics.
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• (M,X) |=+P ψ ∨ θ if and only if (M,X) |=
+
P ψ or (M,X) |=
+
P θ, that is,
by induction hypothesis, if and only if (M,X) 6|=+ ψ∗ or (M,X) 6|= θ∗.
This is the case if and only if (M,X) 6|=+ ψ∗∧θ∗, which by De Morgan’s
Laws15 is easily seen to be equivalent to (ψ ∨ θ)∗.
Furthermore, (M,X) |=−P ψ ∨ θ if and only if whenever X = Y ∪
Z, (M,Y ) |=−P ψ or (M,Y ) |=
−
P θ, that is, by induction hypothesis,
(M,Y ) 6|=− ψ∗ or (M,Z) 6|=− θ∗. By the rules of Team Semantics, this
is the case if and only if (M,X) 6|=− ψ∗ ∧ θ∗, which is again equivalent
to (ψ ∨ θ)∗.
• (M,X) |=+P ∃vφ if and only if (M,X [M/v]) |=
+
P φ, that is, if and only if
(M,X [M/v]) 6|=+ φ∗, that is, if and only if (M,X) 6|=+ ∀vφ∗. Observe
now that ∀vφ∗ is equivalent to (∃vφ)∗.
Furthermore, (M,X) |=−P ∃vφ if and only if for all nondeterministic
choice functions F we have that (M,X [F/v]) |=−P φ, that is, if and only
if for all such F (M,X [F/v]) 6|=− φ∗. Thus, (M,X) 6|=− ∀vφ∗, and the
conclusion follows.

Putting everything together, we obtain at once that
Theorem 4.6. Let φ be a sentence in PFO(=(·, ·)). Then φ is positively logi-
cally equivalent to some first order sentence.
Proof. By the lemma, there is a sentence φ∗ ∈ FO(6=(·, ·)) such that M |=+P φ
if and only if M 6|=+ φ∗. But by the above corollary, we can find a first-order
sentence φ′ such that M |=+ φ∗ if and only if M |= φ′. Thus, M |=P φ if and
only if M |= ¬φ′, as required. 
This result, of course, can be extended with ease to all other first-order
downwards-closed dependencies by observing that the negations of these de-
pendencies are first-order upwards-closed dependencies (and, hence, safe to
add to Team Semantics).
The situation in Paraconsistent Team Semantics is, once again, the dual
of that of Team Semantics: even though non-dependence atoms bring the ex-
pressive power of our formalism far beyond that of First Order Logic (for
instance, there exists a Π11-sentence - and, therefore, a Paraconsistent Non-
dependence Logic sentence - which is true in a model if and only if this
model is finite), dependence atoms do not do so. This suggests the possibility
that, perhaps, Paraconsistent Team Semantics may prove itself a less compu-
tationally demanding, but equally natural, framework than standard Team
Semantics for the study of dependency notions in an abstract setting; but
further work will be necessary in order to investigate the possibilities and the
limitations of this approach.
15Since we defined conjunction and universal quantification using De Morgan’s Laws, and
due to the fact that our definition of negation respects the rule of double negation, these
laws hold in both Team Semantics and Paraconsistent Team Semantics.
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5. Conclusion
As we saw, Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic (that is, the variant of De-
pendence Logic in which the truth of a sentence is not defined in terms of
existence of winning strategies of the Proponent Eloise, but in terms of the
lack of winning strategies for the Opponent Abelard) is a paraconsistent,
conservative extension of First Order Logic that is capable of expressing its
own truth and validity predicates. Furthermore, finding whether a sentence
of this formalism is valid is no harder than finding whether a first order
formula is valid; and the consistent fragment of this logic is equivalent pre-
cisely to First Order Logic. Just as Dependence Logic itself, Paraconsistent
Non-dependence Logic admits both a game theoretic semantics and a com-
positional Team Semantics, and can be thought of as a fragment of Team
Logic [33]; and furthermore, it is expressively equivalent to Universal Second
Order Logic Π11. On the other hand, Paraconsistent Dependence Logic is no
more expressive than First Order Logic insofar as definability of classes of
models is considered.
Ultimately, the reason for our formalism’s paraconsistency - and the
reason why it is capable of expressing its own truth and validity predicates -
lies in its interpretation of negation, which is inherently game-theoretical: to
negate a sentence is not to dismiss the possibility that it is true, but rather
it is to admit one’s incapability of forcing an opponent to admit its truth.
The author dares not make any claims about this being the “right” notion of
negation in some absolute sense: but, nonetheless, it seems to be a semantical
operation which is worth investigating further.
Similarly, we most assuredly make no claim that Paraconsistent Non-
dependence Logic is the “One True Paraconsistent Logic”. It is a formalism
that has a natural definition and elegant theoretical properties, and its notion
of “truth as lack of guarantee of falsifiability” appears to have some episte-
mological interest; but whether a logic is or is not appropriate depends very
much on what we want to use it for. The purpose that led to the development
of Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic was to find a game-theoretically mo-
tivated, paraconsistent, conservative extension of First Order Logic which is
able to express its own truth predicate; and, through this, to point out a
possible connection between Game Theoretic Semantics, Dependence Logic
and paraconsistency. Further research may be useful in order to unveil the
possibilities of this connection: in particular, as we saw, much of the work
of recent years about generalized dependency notions in team semantics and
their definability relations (see for instance [13, 9, 11]) can be adapted to the
setting of Paraconsistent Team Semantics with little to no difficulty, and it
provides ample opportunities to study logics obtained by adding “dependen-
cies” corresponding to further epistemic properties of teams (interpreted as
sets of possible states). Furthermore, even though the proof system of [25] can
be used for finding valid formulas of Paraconsistent Non-Dependence Logic,
it would be interesting to develop directly a proof system for this logic (or
variants thereof).
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One question that we leave entirely open is the connection between
Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic and other known paraconsistent log-
ics: in particular, due to some conceptual similarity between the formalisms,
we conjecture that a close relationship exists between Paraconsistent Non-
dependence Logic and Jas´kowski’s Discussive Logic [21, 4].
In any case, Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic appears to be an
intriguing conservative extension of First Order Logic which adds to it the
ability of expressing its own truth predicate; and it is the hope of the author
that the results of this paper may contribute to a more vigorous exchange of
ideas between the Paraconsistent Logic and the Dependence Logic research
communities.
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